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Sri	Lanka’s	parliamentary	election:	Landslide	win	for
the	Rajapaksa	puts	democracy	and	pluralism	at	risk
Twice	postponed	because	of	the	coronavirus	pandemic,	Sri	Lankans	finally	voted	on	Wednesday,	5	August	in	the
country’s	parliamentary	election.	Here	Alan	Keenan	(LSE	Centre	for	Women,	Peace	and	Security	and
International	Crisis	Group)	explains	why	the	Sri	Lanka	Podujana	Peramuna’s	(SLPP)	electoral	victory	should	be
understood	not	simply	as	a	result	of	dissatisfaction	with	rival	party	United	National	Party	(UNP),	but	of	the	failure	of
its	internationally-backed	liberal	reform	agenda	to	gain	lasting	traction	with	Sri	Lankan	voters,	and	what	the	results
could	mean	for	the	future	of	democracy	and	pluralism	in	Sri	Lanka.
Wednesday,	5	August	saw	the	landslide	general	election	victory	of	the	Sri	Lanka	Podujana	Peramuna	(SLPP),	led
by	President	Gotabaya	Rajapaksa	and	his	brother,	Prime	Minister	Mahinda	Rajapaksa.	The	vote	sets	Sri	Lanka	on
a	path	likely	to	bring	fundamental	political	and	social	change.	With	59	percent	of	the	vote,	the	SLPP	won	enough
seats	–	together	with	allied	parties	–	to	achieve	the	two-thirds	parliamentary	majority	they	requested	from	voters	in
order	to	change	the	constitution.	With	executive	power	shared	between	the	Rajapaksa	brothers,	the	family	and	their
party	have	the	power	to	reshape	Sri	Lanka’s	political	institutions	in	fundamental	–	and	potentially	dangerous	–
ways.
The	Sinhala	nationalist	ideology	the	Rajapaksas	and	the	SLPP	promote	has	long	structured	Sri	Lankan	politics,
marginalising	Tamils	(about	15	percent	of	the	population)	and,	in	different	ways,	Muslims	(who	make	up	ten
percent).	The	explicitly	pro-Sinhala	and	anti-minority	rhetoric	of	the	SLPP’s	campaign,	the	Rajapaksas’
demonstrated	commitment	to	centralised	and	authoritarian	rule	–	Mahinda’s	presidency	from	2005-2015	saw
widespread	human	rights	violations	and	numerous	well-documented	atrocities	–		and	the	comprehensive	defeat	of
the	political	voices	supporting	a	more	liberal,	pluralist	and	tolerant	vision	of	Sri	Lanka	–	together	these	threaten	to
entrench	a	more	dangerously	intolerant	form	of	majoritarianism	than	Sri	Lanka	has	seen	before.
Following	Gotabaya’s	decisive	victory	in	the	November	2019	presidential	election,	and	in	light	of	the	continued
popularity	of	his	elder	brother	Mahinda,	few	political	observers	doubted	the	SLPP	would	win	a	big	victory.	Given	the
mostly	proportional	nature	of	Sri	Lanka’s	electoral	system,	however,	few	expected	it	would	win	a	two-thirds	majority,
something	no	party	had	achieved	before	in	a	single	election.	That	it	was	able	to	cross	this	threshold	is	due	in	part	to
the	long	and	bitter	infighting	that	hobbled	its	main	rival,	the	United	National	Party	(UNP),	which	eventually	split	it	in
two	just	before	the	election	campaign	began.	The	historic	decimation	of	the	UNP	–	it	gained	just	one	seat	from	two
percent	of	the	vote,	while	its	splinter	formation,	the	Samagi	Jana	Balawegaya	(SJB),	won	24	percent	and	54	seats	–
was	a	public	rebuke	for	the	party’s	disastrous	incompetence	when	in	power	from	2015-2019.
Crippled	by	the	dysfunctional	cohabitation	between	President	Maithripala	Sirisena,	leader	of	the	Sri	Lanka	Freedom
Party	(SLFP)	and	his	prime	minister,	UNP	leader	Ranil	Wickemesinghe,	the	government	ignored	intelligence
warnings	and	failed	to	prevent	the	ISIS-inspired	Easter	bombings	that	killed	279	people	and	injured	hundreds	more.
The	SLPP	ran	on	Gotabaya’s	trademark	promises	of	security	and	competent	technocratic	rule,	the	strong
performance	of	his	minority	government	in	limiting	the	spread	of	COVID-19,	and	its	aggressively	Sinhala	and
Buddhist	agenda.	All	this	resonated	widely	with	Sinhalese	voters	who	had	seen	little	improvement	in	their	economic
situation	under	the	UNP	and	had	received	a	steady	diet	of	nationalist,	often	anti-Muslim,	rhetoric	from	the
overwhelmingly	pro-SLPP	and	pro-Rajapaksa	state	and	private	media.	The	SLPP	also	capitalised	on	its	strong	local
party	structures	and	its	sophisticated	and	unrivalled	use	of	social	media.
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But	the	SLPP’s	victory	goes	deeper	than	current	and	recent	party	dynamics.	It	expresses	the	exhaustion	–	and	the
Sinhalese	public’s	rejection	–	of	the	liberal,	largely	western-oriented	elite	that	dominated	the	UNP	and,	until	at	least
2005,	had	strong	influence	within	the	SLPP’s	predecessor,	the	Sri	Lanka	Freedom	Party	(SLFP).	Promises	of	inter-
ethnic	reconciliation,	constitutional	reform	for	greater	devolution	of	power	to	Tamil-majority	regions,	strengthened
rule	of	law	and	human	rights	protections	and	accountability	for	past	abuses	–	this	was	a	political	reform	agenda
encouraged	by	western	governments	and	taken	up,	if	rather	timidly,	by	the	last	UNP	administration,	after	being
endorsed	on	paper	by	other	governments	before	it.	That	agenda	is	now	dead.	Badly	packaged	to	the	public,	linked
to	no	clear	or	tangible	benefits	to	average	Sinhalese	during	the	UNP’s	2015-19	government,	and	undercut	by	the
economic	liberalisation	policies	that	accompanied	it,	the	liberal	reform	agenda	was	no	match	for	the	relentless
nationalist	rhetoric	and	framing	of	issues	by	the	Rajapaksas	and	their	media	allies	since	the	formation	of	the	SLPP
in	2016.	The	UNP’s	back-to-back	defeats	in	2019	and	2020	express	the	decisive	victory	of	nationalist	narratives
and	policies	that	have	been	promoted	for	decades.
Sri	Lanka’s	democracy	has	always	been	incomplete	and	deeply	flawed.	Tamils	have	been	excluded	from	effective
power-sharing	and	their	collective	identity	undermined.	Muslims’	economic	and	cultural	security	is	at	growing	risk.
But	even	as	an	ethnocracy,	rather	than	a	full	democracy,	important	elements	in	Sri	Lanka	have	resisted	the	full
flowering	of	a	Sinhala	Buddhist	hegemonic	project.	The	island’s	embattled	pluralist	traditions,	and	the	occasional
attempts	to	give	institutional	form	to	Sri	Lanka’s	multicultural	and	multi-religious	demographic	reality,	however,	are
now	so	severely	weakened	as	to	be	politically	irrelevant.	Under	Gotabaya	Rajapaksa’s	presidency	the	state	has
abandoned	any	pretence	of	Sri	Lanka	as	a	multi-cultural	nation.	Even	as	the	country	suffered	repeated	periods	of
insurgency,	brutal	counter-insurgency	and	mass	atrocity	–	culminating	in	the	tens	of	thousands	of	Tamil	civilians
killed	in	the	final	stages	of	the	war	with	the	Tamil	Tigers	in	2009	–	Sri	Lanka	retained	genuine	democratic	energies
and	traditions	of	questioning	and	contesting	the	ruling	powers.	These	traditions	–	and	those	who	wish	to	maintain
them	–	are	now	under	intense	pressure.
What	this	is	likely	to	mean	in	practice	is	a	deepening	of	developments	already	begun	during	Gotabaya’s	first	nine
months	in	office.	The	president’s	preference	for	centralised	rule	with	little	oversight	is	clear:	he	has	ruled	without
parliament	for	the	previous	five	months	–	despite	the	constitution’s	explicit	limit	of	three	months	–	relying	instead	on
a	series	of	ad	hoc	presidential	task	forces	to	set	and	implement	policy.	The	SLPP’s	central	campaign	pledge	was	to
abolish	or	drastically	rework	–	they	never	proposed	specific	changes	–	the	nineteenth	amendment.	Approved	by
parliament	in	2015	with	only	one	vote	against,	the	amendment	limited	the	president’s	previously	near-absolute
powers.	It	expanded	the	powers	of	the	prime	minister	and	strengthened	a	series	of	independent	oversight
commissions	–	e.g.,	on	police,	human	rights,	judiciary	and	right	to	information	–	and	the	constitutional	council	that
appoints	them.	All	this	is	certain	to	change.	Gotabaya	and	Mahinda	might,	quite	naturally,	disagree	over	how	to
distribute	their	respective	powers	as	president	and	prime	minister,	and	intra-family	tensions	could	shape	policy,	but
it	is	clear	that	the	executive	as	a	whole	will	be	made	significantly	stronger	and	the	power	of	the	Rajapaksa	family
consolidated	for	the	long	term.
The	military	and	the	Buddhist	clergy	will	also	continue	to	enjoy	the	expanded	prestige	and	power	they	have
received	so	far	under	Gotabaya.	The	ministry	of	defence	has	taken	over	numerous	non-military	agencies,	and
serving	and	retired	military	personnel	have	been	appointed	to	at	least	twenty	senior	civil	administrative	positions,
including	the	presidential	task	force	on	controlling	the	COVID-19	outbreak,	chaired	by	the	serving	army
commander.	A	separate	presidential	task	force	“to	build	…	a	disciplined,	virtuous	and	lawful	society”	is	staffed
entirely	by	military	and	police	officers	and	has	sweeping	powers	to	oversee	and	direct	government	agencies	outside
of	established	procedures.	A	number	of	the	retired	and	serving	generals	are	implicated	by	the	UN	and	others	in
gross	human	rights	violations	during	the	final	months	of	the	civil	war.	A	third	task	force	on	preserving	archaeological
heritage	in	the	multi-ethnic	and	majority	Tamil-speaking	eastern	province	features	senior	defence	and	police
officials	and	prominent	nationalist	Buddhist	monks,	but	no	Tamils	or	Muslims.
Tamils	and	Muslims	in	the	north	and	east	feel	their	land	rights	are	increasingly	vulnerable	to	seizures	by	a	range	of
government	initiatives,	often	through	the	construction	of	military	camps	and	Buddhist	temples,	or	through
environmental	and	archaeological	regulations.	The	government	is	also	expected	to	propose	new	legislation	to
regulate	Muslim	religious	education	and	marriage	laws	–	done	in	the	name	of	curbing	“extremism”	–	as	part	of	a
wider	set	of	policies	widely	seen	by	Muslims	and	rights	activists	as	designed	to	weaken	the	community	and	assert
the	primacy	of	Sinhalese	and	Buddhists.	Soon	after	coming	to	power,	Gotabaya	established	a	Buddhist	Advisory
Council,	which	he	meets	once	a	month,	and	his	inauguration	ceremony	in	November	and	Mahinda’s	swearing-in	as
prime	minister	on	9	August	were	both	held	at	important	and	politically-powerful	Buddhist	temples.
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The	first	nine	months	of	Gotabaya’s	presidency	has	seen	a	concerted	attack	on	the	rule	of	law	and	the
independence	of	the	police	and	judiciary.	Police	investigations	into	corruption,	murder	and	abduction	cases
implicating	officials	serving	when	Mahinda	was	president,	including	Gotabaya	and	senior	military	officials,	have
been	stopped,	with	the	key	investigators	either	transferred	or	in	some	cases	themselves	charged	with	crimes	on
flimsy	grounds.	There	are	increasing	reports	of	lawyers	involved	in	human	rights	cases	facing	intimidation	by	police
or	military,	and	there	are	growing	fears	of	a	return	to	the	active	repression	of	dissent	experienced	during	Mahinda
Rajapaksa’s	presidency,	when	scores	of	media	personnel,	humanitarian	workers	and	political	activists,	particularly
but	not	only	Tamils,	were	killed,	assaulted	or	forced	into	exile.	With	the	government	now	possessing	new
technologies	that	provide	radically	expanded	powers	of	surveillance,	and	enjoying	unprecedented	influence	in	both
traditional	and	social	media,	democratic	space	is	at	real	risk.
In	this	environment,	the	opposition	–	divided	on	ideological	and	ethno-religious	lines	–	has	its	work	cut	out	for	it.
Following	the	collapse	of	the	UNP,	the	SJB	will	face	a	major	test	in	becoming	an	effective	opposition.	Led	by	long-
time	UNP	leader-in-waiting	Sajith	Premadasa,	the	party	will	need	to	find	a	way	of	distinguishing	itself	from	the	failed
liberalism	of	the	UNP	while	effectively	challenging	the	hyper-nationalism	of	the	SLPP.	The	election	also	weakened
the	position	of	the	leftist	Janath	Vimukthi	Peramuna	(JVP),	which	once	again	failed	to	emerge	as	a	strong	third
force,	despite	the	hopes	and	growing	support	of	progressive	intellectuals	and	activists.	Thanks	in	part	to	savvy
government	moves,	the	Tamil	vote	was	increasingly	splintered,	with	smaller	parties	eating	considerably	into	the
support	of	the	largest	grouping,	the	Tamil	National	Alliance.	Muslim	parties,	and	community	as	a	whole,	remain
divided	and	have	yet	to	devise	an	effective	response	to	the	years	of	anti-Muslim	violence	and	hate-speech	and	the
rising	levels	of	distrust	that	followed	the	Easter	bombings,	which	Gotabaya	and	the	SLPP	have	skilfully	exploited.
Despite	the	Rajapaksas’	overwhelming	victory	and	essentially	unbridled	power,	the	next	months	and	years	will
bring	major	challenges.		Most	urgent	is	a	looming	economic	crisis.	Prior	to	the	arrival	of	COVID-19,	the	government
was	facing	major	difficulties	paying	back	its	large	foreign	debt,	with	some	$3-4	billion	in	loan	payments	due	over	the
next	year.	Chronic	fiscal	deficits,	which	make	it	hard	to	maintain	Sri	Lanka’s	beleaguered	welfare	state,	has	already
grown	under	Gotabaya’s	watch	and	are	expected	to	grow	further.	The	COVID-19	crisis,	while	surprisingly	well-
controlled	domestically,	has	crippled	the	nation’s	main	sources	of	desperately	needed	hard	currency:	tourism,
remittances	from	overseas	workers,	and	exports.	To	date,	the	government	has	presented	no	concrete	proposals	for
bridging	its	financial	gaps,	other	than	appealing	to	creditors	for	debt	relief	and	deepening	its	ties	with	China,	which
offered	a	$500	million	emergency	loan	in	March.	While	the	economic	pain	has	yet	to	reach	breaking	point,	popular
expectations	of	government	relief	are	high.	Should	they	be	disappointed,	political	unrest	is	not	out	of	the	question.
Many	Muslims	fear	they	could	be	made	scapegoats,	and	a	convenient	target	for	displacing	popular	anger.
It	remains	uncertain	whether	China	has	the	resources	or	the	will	to	bail	out	Sri	Lanka	single-handedly.	The	new
government	is	certain	to	repeat	its	previously	successful	strategy	of	using	fears	about	China’s	growing	political	–
and	possible	military	–	role	in	Sri	Lanka	to	encourage	increased	financial	support	from	India,	Japan	and	Western
governments.	With	hostility	to	China	rising	sharply	among	all	these	actors,	Sri	Lanka’s	ability	to	play	the	two	blocs
off	against	each	other	may	not	be	endless,	however.	Should	economic	and	military	competition	with	China	continue
to	grow,	it	remains	possible	the	anti-Chinese	bloc	could	choose	to	collaborate	more	closely	and	challenge	Sri
Lanka’s	move	further	into	the	Chinese	orbit	by	using	their	collective	political	and	economic	leverage	in	more
punitive	ways.	Given	the	increased	use	of	human	rights-related	targeted	sanctions	against	Chinese	officials,	this
could	be	accompanied	by	renewed	challenges	on	the	unfinished	human	rights	and	accountability	agenda	left-over
from	the	brutal	end	to	the	civil	war.	This	could	either	be	through	the	UN	Human	Rights	Council,	which	once	again
considers	Sri	Lanka	in	March	2021,	or	through	attempts	to	assert	universal	jurisdiction	or	impose	targeted	sanctions
against	some	of	the	key	military	and	political	leaders	–	including	Gotabaya	–	against	whom	there	are	credible
allegations	of	serious	violations	of	international	criminal	law.
For	the	moment,	however,	all	of	Sri	Lanka’s	key	international	partners	appear	willing	to	work	with	the	newly-elected
government.	Western	governments	and	the	UN	in	particular	hope	it	can	be	cajoled	into	moderating	its	more
authoritarian	and	hardline	nationalist	policies,	while	successfully	managing	the	economic	crisis	that	appears	to	be
just	on	the	horizon.	Sri	Lanka’s	international	partners	will	ultimately	need	to	develop	more	effective	ways	to	support
its	pluralist	traditions	and	protect	its	democratic	space	than	has	been	the	case	to	date.	In	the	meantime,	one	has	to
hope	that	Sri	Lanka’s	embattled	rights	activists,	independent	journalists	and	other	democratic	and	pluralist	voices
are	able	to	develop	the	new	strategies	that	will	be	required	to	resist	the	country’s	complete	collapse	into	nationalist
authoritarianism.
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